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important information intermediaries in two 
specific aspects: bias and accuracy.
The study is focused on the quarterly 
earnings projections for Brazilian firms 
covering the period from the first quarter 
of 2007 through the fourth quarter of 2011, 
predominantly those with shares listed for 
trading in the Novo Mercado (New Market) 
segment of the São Paulo Stock, Commodity 
and Future Exchange (BM&FBovespa). 
The investigation is based on the premise 
that the best representation of the market’s 
expectations can be obtained from a central 
tendency measure of the distribution of 
analysts’ projections.
This study innovates by evaluating 
the possible benefits of the adoption of IFRS 
in Brazil, by investigating the statistical 
properties of analysts’ projections in the 
years around their adoption. We believed 
the question of whether analysts benefited 
from the adoption of IFRS, in terms more 
accurate and less biased forecasts, is of 
interest to market participants because of 
the importance of analysts’ projections to 
investment decisions. 
1. INTRODUCTION
An important part of analysts’ work in 
the capital market is the projection of future 
earnings, because this is a key variable for 
stock valuation models. Good projections of 
future results are a prerequisite for adequate 
measurement of the fair value of a stock.
In this context, it is important to 
analyzed the characteristics (or properties) 
of these projections by analysts in the capital 
market. Are they accurate? Is there some type 
of bias? Knowing the accuracy of analysts’ 
projections provides important support to 
guide investors regarding the validity (or 
limitations) of these projections for their 
valuation models.
For the purpose of identifying the 
general characteristics of analysts’ projections 
for Brazilian companies, in this article we 
seek to document the performance of these 
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Using data from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S, we investigated the statistical properties 
of analysts’ quarterly earnings projections in the years around the adoption of IFRS 
in Brazil (2007 to 2011). Characteristics such as accuracy, bias and precision of 
analysts’ forecasts are useful in different situations. The results indicate that the 
accuracy improved with increased coverage and for more profitable firms. Univariate 
and multivariate tests did not indicate significant changes in the accuracy and bias of 
the forecasts in the years around the adoption of IFRS.
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Brazil adopted International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) starting in 
2008 after the enactment of Lei 11,638 of 
December 28, 2007, which amended key 
provisions of the Law of Corporations (Law 
6,404/76) regarding accounting standards. 
According to  Antunes et al. (2012),  the main 
innovation of the process of convergence 
to international standards is that Brazilian 
accounting practice is now more based on 
the interpretations issued by the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee (Comitê de 
Pronunciamentos Contábeis - CPC) than on 
mere application of legal rules as previously. 
This presumably brings relevant implications 
for the quality of accounting information and 
for those that rely on this information, such 
as investors and financial market analysts. 
In general lines, the analyses performed 
permit concluding that in the period studied 
the projections presented by Brazilian analysts 
demonstrated a significantly pessimistic bias. 
The accuracy of these projections was on 
average positively influenced by the number 
of analysts covering a firm and negatively 
by firm size. Regarding IFRS adoption, the 
results do not show significant benefits in the 
statistical properties of the forecasts, both 
with respect to accuracy and bias.
The article is divided into six sections 
besides this introduction. In the next section 
we discuss the concepts of accuracy, bias 
and precision and in the third we review the 
literature on adoption of IFRS and analysts’ 
projections. We then explain the research 
method and the database in the fourth 
section and discuss and analyze the results of 
univariate and multivariate analyses covering 
the years around the adoption of IFRS in 
Brazil the fifth section. We close the article 
with a set of conclusions and implications for 
those that rely on analysts’ forecasts for stock 
valuation models.
2. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS: 
ACCURACY, BIAS AND 
PRECISION
In examining the earnings projections 
of analysts, both from an individual and 
consensus perspective, various approaches 
can be employed. One alternative is to 
identify the statistical properties of their 
projections. The accuracy, bias and precision 
(or reliability) of the projections are examples 
of aspects evaluated and tested to observe 
whether analysts are doing a good job.
The precision or reliability of a set 
of estimations is related inversely to the 
variance (or standard deviation): the lower 
the variance is, the higher the precision 
will be. Bias is an error in the estimations 
that makes the average value estimated for 
a parameter to be systematically different 
from its true value. The level of accuracy is 
defined by the combination of or precision 
and bias. In simple terms, it can be said that 
a set of estimations will be more accurate the 
lower the bias and the greater the precision 
are. But perfect precision (zero variance) is 
not a sufficient condition for accuracy.
Target shooting is an analogy 
commonly used to clarify these concepts. 
The bullseye is the true value of a population, 
which an investigator tries to hit by analyzing 
the sample. 
An unbiased and precise estimator 
is one that identifies values very near the 
bullseye, with significant accuracy. A precise, 
but biased, estimator is one that predicts 
values near each other but far from the correct 
value. An unbiased but imprecise estimator 
chooses values are far from each other and 
that also miss the bullseye, despite being 
evenly dispersed around it. Finally, a biased 
and imprecise estimator selects values that 
are scattered far from each other and miss the 
bullseye, but are not evenly spaced around 
it, instead showing a tendency for error in a 
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particular direction. Figure 1 illustrates these 
concepts.
Figure 1. Illustration of the concepts of bias, 
accuracy and precision
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Analysts’ projections and adoption of 
IFRS
One of the reasons given for many 
countries to adopt IFRS was that this 
would increase the quality and quantity of 
disclosures. This improvement should permit 
analysts to have a better understanding 
of firms’ performance, leading to better 
forecasts. According to Brown (2011), 
proponents of IFRS claim they improve the 
comparability and transparency of financial 
statements.
In the post-2005 European setting, 
Hodgdon et al. (2008) concluded that the 
observance of IFRS improved the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecasts, mainly regarding 
Swiss and German firms. Byard et al. 
(2011), Preiato et al. (2009) and Wang et al. 
(2008) all documented an improvement in 
the accuracy of projections for firms in the 
European Community after the adoption of 
IFRS. However, according to Hodgdon et al. 
(2008), the improvements in the information 
environment related to IFRS in Europe 
were greater for companies that voluntarily 
adopted IFRS. In the same sense, Horton et 
al. (2010) observed that the adoption of IFRS 
resulted in smaller prediction errors for firms 
that mandatorily adopted IFRS in comparison 
to those that did so voluntarily.
However, the existing studies are 
not always conclusive. Dake (2005) found 
less accuracy and greater dispersion in the 
predictions of analysts for German firms that 
adopted International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) between 1993 and 2002. Cuijpers & 
Buijink (2005) reported greater dispersion 
in the forecasts for firms in the European 
Community using IAS, but stated these 
results could reflect a selection bias for firms 
that voluntarily adopted the international 
standards. 
Regarding mandatory adoption, 
Aubert & Dumontier (2010) argued that 
analysts are not always able to efficiently 
anticipate the consequences of IFRS 
adoption. It might be that predictions become 
harder under IFRS, depending on the extent 
of the changes in national GAAP in relation 
to IFRS and the resulting impact on earnings 
calculations. Finally, Beuselink et al. (2010) 
concluded that IFRS adoption improves the 
processing of information by analysts in 
general, but this effect is not homogeneous 
for all analysts.
Despite the fair number of studies for 
other countries, to the best of our knowledge 
there are no studies of the effects of IFRS 
adoption on the statistical properties of 
analysts’ forecasts for Brazilian companies.
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3.2 Is there a bias in analysts’ projections?
The international literature over the 
past two decades has generally concluded 
that analysts tend to be optimists. This 
optimistic bias is inferred from the finding 
that there is a consistently negative difference 
between observed and estimated earnings. 
In other words, earnings projections are 
predominantly higher than those actually 
obtained. This optimism has been verified 
by using data from Value Line, I/B/E/S and 
Zacks. The estimates of analysts’ optimism 
vary from study to study, due to differences in 
the methods used, definition of the variables 
and the period analyzed, among other factors.
Lim (1998), using the average of 
quarterly profit estimates, found optimism 
of 0.94% of the price. The bias was 
considerably higher, at 2.5%, for small firms, 
in comparison with 0.53% for companies 
with large capitalization. The author found 
this bias to be present in the entire market for 
all years studied. Richardson et al. (1999), 
using individual analysts’ projections and 
projection errors analyzed in yearly and 
monthly time frames, found that while 
bias existed for both horizons, there was a 
significant decline in this bias, from 0.91% 
to 0.09% of the price, when the projection 
horizon was reduced from a year to a month. 
However, Brown (1998) observed that the 
bias appeared to have shifted from optimistic 
to pessimistic, or at least almost nil.
A possible explanation given in the 
literature for bias is the existence of a large 
number of extreme observations, causing 
asymmetric distribution of the projection 
errors. Gu & Wu (2003) and Abarbanell & 
Lehavy (2003) observed that a small number 
of projection errors disproportionately 
contribute to the observed bias.
In the Brazilian case, the tendency 
for optimistic bias has also been documented 
by Martinez (2004), Saito et al. (2008) and 
Dalmácio et al. (2011). Both studies, although 
relying on different methods and databases 
and trying to resolve distinct problems, noted 
the existence of an optimistic bias in analysts’ 
projections for Brazilian firms. However, 
these studies cover periods before 2004. 
There are no studies in the Brazilian 
literature touching on the statistical behavior 
of the prediction errors in recent years, 
particularly after the adoption of IFRS in the 
country. Our aim here is to fill in this gap in 
the national literature.
3.3 What are the determinants of bias in 
analysts’ projections?
According to Kothari (2001), the 
determining factors for bias in analysts’ 
projections are of two types: a) economic 
incentives; and b) behavioral-cognitive 
postures.
a) Economic motivations
An important economic incentive 
for “sell-side” analysts to issue optimistic 
earnings projections is the compensation 
they receive for their services. Investment 
banks obtain much of their revenues from 
their services related to issuance of securities 
and assistance in mergers and acquisitions. 
Optimistic projections by analysts can 
help stimulate new deals. In this sense, Lin 
& McNichols (1998) stated that analysts 
who work for institutions affiliated with 
investment banks will tend to issue more 
upbeat projections.
Another reasonable explanation for 
bias is analysts’ concerns over obtaining 
as much access as possible to information 
from managers, especially in cases of large 
information asymmetry between the firm 
and investment community. Although they 
realize that bias in their projections is not 
desirable, they opt to err on the optimistic 
side to create a more favorable relationship 
with managers and hence gain the inside 
track to obtain important information. In this 
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respect, Lim (1998) and Das et al. (1998) 
demonstrated that the bias increases as the 
information asymmetry (or uncertainty) 
increases between the firm and the investment 
community.
b) Behavioral-cognitive postures
According to the behavioral 
explanations for bias, analysts consistently 
overreact to information (especially on past 
earnings), which causes them to take a biased 
stance. It is naturally assumed that positive 
overreactions will outweigh negative ones, 
i.e., exaggerated responses to good news 
will be greater than to bad news. DeBondt & 
Thaler (1985; 1987), in their classic works on 
the subject, proposed the existence of such a 
cognitive bias mechanism.
Another very coherent explanation 
was traced out by Trueman (1994). He 
concluded that analysts tend to imitate the 
behavior of their peers, seeking to follow the 
consensus. He applied elegant mathematical 
models to show that analysts tend to make 
projections near to previous expectations. 
This causes herding behavior among analysts, 
in which their projections are similar to those 
announced previously by other analysts, 
even when the information is different. 
This behavior undermines the fundamental 
hypothesis for calculating the consensus 
projects, namely that the projections are 
independent.
4. RESEARCH METHOD
4.1 Database
To analyze the statistical properties 
of the earnings projections for Brazilian 
companies, we used the data collected by 
the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S system. Since 
1971, I/B/E/S has been the most important 
source of earnings projections for investment 
professionals throughout the world. 
According to Nobel Laureate William Sharpe 
(1998), in a comment in his classic manual 
“Investments”: “While I/B/E/S is not the only 
company collecting earnings expectations 
data...it was the first and remains the leader 
in the field... The systematic collection of 
earnings estimates is an excellent example 
of the forces that have been increasing the 
efficiency of security markets. Before I/B/E/S 
collected such data, consensus earnings 
estimates were difficult to obtain and highly 
ambiguous.”
The Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S system 
contains projections and recommendations of 
analysts throughout the world, including on 
Brazilian firms. There are three main sections 
in the I/B/E/S database: a) Detail History, b) 
Summary History and c) Recommendations. 
The Detail History section contains 
individual estimates of analysts over time, 
while the Summary History section contains 
the consensus estimates of all analysts in a 
determined period.
Here we study the period from the 
first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 
2011. In this part of the study we used all the 
Brazilian firms listed for trading in the Novo 
Mercado segment of the BM&FBovespa 
about which there was information in the 
database. We did not carry out any type of 
selection. In the above period we analyzed 
92 listed Brazilian companies by examining 
the quarterly earnings per share (EPS) 
projections. This figure is a key variable for 
many valuation models. Among the various 
metrics available, we verified that in the EPS 
projections for the current year contained the 
greatest number of observations. 
We collected the EPS projections for 
each quarter going back one year beforehand, 
The Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S system 
contains information on forecast earnings 
based on the average estimate of analysts 
and reports the number of analysts that 
participated in each average estimate. The 
other data used in this study were obtained 
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from the Economática system, including the 
observed earnings and the control variables 
used.
In computing the projection errors, 
we found a large number of disparate values, 
indicating possible errors in entering data 
in the base. To rectify this problem, we 
applied Grubb’s test to detect outliers, as 
recommended by Martins (2002: 59). This 
led us to exclude 20 observations from the 
sample, leaving a total of 1,004 observations. 
4.2. Metrics for bias, accuracy and 
precision of the projections
To identify the performance of 
analysts in their projections, we computed 
the bias, accuracy and precision. Bias was 
calculated as the difference between the 
actual (observed) earnings result and the 
average figure projected by analysts. When 
this difference is negative, it indicates a 
negative surprise, or that the true earnings 
fell short of the predicted level. Likewise, a 
positive difference means the actual earnings 
were higher than the consensus projection.
For purposes of comparability, we 
computed the projection errors in terms of 
earnings per share (EPS). Therefore, the 
forecast error (bias) measure for this study is 
the real (observed) EPS for the period minus 
the forecast EPS divided by the absolute 
value of the real EPS:
real pred
real
EPS EPS
Bias
EPS
−
=
Where
EPS
real 
= Real earnings per share in 
the period covered by the forecast
EPSpred = Predicted earnings per 
share according to the consensus of analysts 
(average)
We used the absolute value (modulus) 
in the denominator so as not to lose the 
direction of the projection error for firms 
with negative earnings.
From a methodological standpoint, 
there are various other measures to scale 
projection errors. Besides actual earnings 
results (observed profit or loss), it is very 
common to find articles in the international 
literature that have measured forecast errors in 
percentage terms of the stock price. However, 
we believe that consideration of stock price 
can bring distortions by introducing into 
the calculation the price factor over which 
analysts have no control. 
We also did not use total assets (or 
stockholders’ equity) as a factor to deflate 
the forecast errors. First, we believe that total 
assets could be correlated with the forecast 
errors in an undesirable way. In working 
with figures deflated by total assets, one is in 
essence measuring an indicator of return on 
assets. Second, some economic sectors have 
a higher average ROA than others, so this 
factor could compromise the comparability 
of the projection errors measured.
We recognize, however, that the 
procedure of measuring the forecast error in 
terms of the actual result is not immune from 
problems. For example, the forecast errors 
for firms that obtain profits or losses very 
near zero are exaggerated. Additionally, this 
required elimination of observations where 
the actual earnings figure was zero.
We also measured the accuracy of 
the projections in terms of the real earnings 
per share, in this case taking the absolute 
value of the entire expression rather than 
just the numerator (observed earnings minus 
predicted earnings):
real pred
real
EPS EPS
Accur
EPS
−
=
This formulation allows considering 
the distribution of errors that in absolute 
terms are near zero, but regardless of whether 
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they are positive or negative. Therefore, in 
measuring the accuracy, all the errors are 
considered, in contrast to the measurement of 
bias, where the positive errors cancel negative 
errors of the same magnitude. The lower the 
metric is, the greater is the accuracy of the 
estimate.
We applied t-statistic tests to check 
the null hypothesis that the average of the 
prediction errors (bias) was different from 
zero. To attest that the results determined were 
not compromised by the scale used to deflate 
the projection errors, we present the signs of 
these errors.
Finally, we estimated the precision as 
the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
distribution of the projection errors (bias). 
Therefore, the lower the standard deviation, 
the more precise the analysts’ estimates are.
5. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive statistics
According to Table 1, the data from 
the analysts’ projections indicate a statistical 
predominance of positive errors (86.62%) 
over negative errors (41.22%). Panel A shows 
the mean of the distribution of the analysts’ 
projection errors, with a significantly positive 
value of 0.40749 (t-statistic = 16.110). 
Likewise, the median is strongly positive at 
0.69621.
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics for the analysts’ EPS projections for the following year, measured between the 
1st quarter of 2007 and 4th quarter of 2011
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the frequency distribution of the analysts’ projection errors for earnings 
per share (EPS) for the next period, computed based on information from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S system in the 
period from the 1st quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2011. Panel A records the mean, median and other statistics for 
the positive and negative forecast errors. Panel B shows the percentiles of the error frequency distribution. 
Panel A: Statistics of the distribution of the projection errors
All Errors Negative Errors       Positive Errors
N (observations) 1,004 138 865
Percentage (%) 100% 13.88% 86.62%
Mean 0.40749 -1.3158 0.6824
Median – P 50 0.69621 -1.1658 0.7173
Standard Deviation 0.80109 0.9825 0.2028
Skewness -2.929 -1.406 2.359
Kurtosis 10.557 2.245 38.538
Minimum -4.8937 -4.8937 0.0137
Maximum 3.3625 -0.0032 3.3625
Est. t for difference of bias from 
zero
t = 16.110
Panel B: Statistics of asymmetry of the tails of the distribution of projecting errors
                    P 5 -1.3979
P 10 -0.7543
P 25 -0.4908
P 75 0.7665
P 90 0.8373
P 95 0.8802
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To understand the distribution of 
projection errors better, we analyzed them 
in percentile terms (Panel B). This analysis 
revealed a particularity of this distribution: 
the negative tail is longer than the positive 
one. Intuitively this means that the extreme 
projection errors (tails) are predominantly 
optimistic.
In Panel C, we segmented the 
observations into two groups: a first group 
containing firms that obtained profits in the 
period targeted by the projection and a second 
group containing firms that lost money in 
that period. The aim of this stratification 
was to check if there are any systematic 
differences in the accuracy and bias between 
the projections for profitable and unprofitable 
firms. The differences in accuracy and bias are 
significant between the two groups of firms 
(as shown by the t-statistics). The results are 
revealing, improving the understanding of 
the bias and accuracy of analysts of Brazilian 
firms.
In general lines the results indicate 
that Brazilian analysts do a relatively better 
job when a firm reports profits, because they 
persistently underestimate negative results. 
This apparent optimism likely results from 
the reluctance of analysts to report loss 
projections.
The graph in Figure 2 allows 
visualizing the distribution of the projection 
errors, showing from left to right the variation 
of negative to positive errors. 
Simple observation of the distribution 
and its associated statistics can lead to the 
opinion that Brazilian analysts were ex 
post pessimists in the years around IFRS 
adoption. In other words, their projections 
were predominantly lower than the earnings 
actually observed. 
Figure 2 – Histogram of the analysts’ projection 
errors for quarterly EPS between -3.0 and 3.0
Distribution of the errors of the consensus projections 
of analysts for EPS, for quarterly observations from 
the 1st quarter of 2007 to the 4th quarter of 2011, 
computed from information from Thomson Reuters 
I/B/E/S. The average projection errors in terms of real 
EPS are on the horizontal axis while the percentage 
of the observations found in a determined bar are on 
the vertical axis. 
To complement this study, Figure 3 
plots the dispersion diagram between real 
and estimated earnings. It can be seen that 
the observations with real positive earnings 
tend to be above the 45º line from the origin, 
meaning the real earnings tend to be greater 
than the estimated figures. The projections 
associated with real negative earnings, on the 
other hand, are visibly more optimistic.
Panel C:  Temporal pattern of the quarterly EPS projection errors for firms that disclose profits 
and losses
 
N- Forecast  Accur Mean Accur StD Bias Mean  Bias StD 
Profit 894 0.7522 0.4187 0.4599 0.7286 
Losses 110 0.9036 0.7253 -0.0179 1.1617 
Total  1.004 0.7688 0.4642 0.4075 0.8011 
T Test  Mean Differences -3.241 6.005 
Sig (2 tailed) 0.001 0.000 
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Table 2  Metrics in the years around IFRS adoption (2007 – 2011)
Panel A: Temporal evolution of the bias, accuracy and dispersion
    
Years Mean Mean StandDev Mean Median StandDev 
2007 0.4132 0.7143 0.8229 0.7723 0.7407 0.4971 
2008 0.3881 0.6774 0.8246 0.7374 0.6963 0.5329 
2009 0.2353 0.6419 0.9170 0.7758 0.7242 0.5398 
2010 0.5400 0.7185 0.5814 0.7322 0.7356 0.3043 
2011 0.4088 0.7013 0.8500 0.8095 0.7355 0.4794 
T-Test Mean Diff. 
2007-2011 0.0450 -0.6700 
Sig (2 tailed) 0.9640 0.5030 
Bias Accur 
Panel B: Boxplot of the bias and accuracy (2007 to 2011)
Bias Boxplot
 
Accuracy Boxplot
.
5.3. Multivariate analysis
 To enrich the study and reduce the 
chance of cross effects, we also performed a 
multivariate analysis to test how the accuracy 
and bias can be explained by the adoption of 
IFRS as well as other explanatory variables 
of the forecasts’ properties. We used the 
following variables to describe the behavior 
of accuracy and bias:
 - Years x IFRS: We assigned a 
progressive variable to indicate the years. 
This choice was based on the assumption of 
a learning curve for working with the new 
standards (learning by doing). Therefore, we 
attributed a value of zero to 2007, the year 
before adoption, and then increase the value 
by one for each succeeding year, so that the 
value of 4 was attributed to 2011, after four 
years of experience working with IFRS. This 
scheme is depicted below:
 Years      N IFRS =  Years * IFRS
 2007  0 0 =   0
 2008  1 1 =   1
 2009  2 1 =   2
 2010  3 1 =   3
 2011  4 1 =   4
 - Loss dummy: In view of the specific 
behavior noted in the previous analysis 
for cases of loss-making firms, we created 
a dummy to control for this. Apparently 
analysts have markedly different performance 
when making forecasts for firms with negative 
earnings than for profitable ones. This variable 
is 0 for firms that made a profit in the forecast 
period and 1 for those that lost money.
 - Number of estimates: Considering 
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that the number of analysts following a firm 
can influence the propagation of information 
and the quality of the projection depends on the 
information environment, in the multivariate 
analysis we controlled for this factor.
 - Log_assets: To control for firm size, 
we computed the logarithm of total assets in 
period t.
5.3.1. Correlation matrix
 Table 3 presents the matrix of 
correlations between the accuracy and bias 
variables and the control variables. This matrix 
provides important insight into the correlation 
of the variables.
 Mention should be made of the 
significant Pearson correlations, indicating the 
sign of how the variables oscillate. Although 
not shown in the table, we also computed the 
nonparametric Spearman correlations and the 
results were in the same sense.
 The variable Years*IFRS is positively 
correlated with the number of analysts and firm 
size. We did not find significant correlations 
between this variable and either accuracy or 
bias. As expected, with a reduction of bias, the 
accuracy improved. Also, bias is negatively 
correlated with the dummy for loss, indicating 
that analysts in the period were more likely 
to make overly optimistic and less accurate 
forecasts for firms that wound up losing 
money in the period covered by the earnings 
prediction.
Table 3  Matrix of Correlations 
 
Bias Accur Num_An. Years*IFRS Log_Asset Dummy-Loss 
Corr. Pearson 1 -.664** .121** 0.035 .070* -.186** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.270 0.028 0.000 
Corr. Pearson -.664** 1 -0.05 0.031 0.047 .102** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.111 0.324 0.138 0.001 
Corr. Pearson .121** -0.05 1 .247** .468** -.113** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Corr. Pearson 0.035 0.031 .247** 1 .123** -0.028 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.270 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.380 
Corr. Pearson .070* 0.047 .468** .123** 1 -.089** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.028 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.005 
Corr. Pearson -.186** .102** -.113** -0.028 -.089** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.3800 0.005 
**. Correlation is  significant at  0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Dummy-Loss 
Bias 
Accur 
Num_An. 
Years*IFRS 
Log_Assets 
Figure 3 – Real versus predicted earnings, 2007-
2011, quarterly projections
5.2  Metrics in the years around IFRS 
adoption
 To analyze the differences in accuracy 
and bias from 2007 to 2011, we computed the 
mean and standard deviation of each of these 
variables for each year. The results are shown 
in Table 2. It can be noted that the mean 
accuracy and bias hold relatively steady 
in all the years, while the observations are 
highly dispersed (large standard deviation), 
indicating low precision of the estimates. 
To better illustrate the concepts, 
we constructed the boxplots of the bias 
and accuracy of the estimates. These show 
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Table 4  Regression Models
Panel A : Dependent Variables : Bias
Standard 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constante) 0.26 0.292 0.89 0.374
Years*IFRS 0.003 0.019 0.005 0.163 0.871
Dummy-Loss -.448 .080 -.175 -5.607 0.000
Num-Anal .054 .020 .096 2.668 0.008
Log_Asset 0.005 0.002 .008 0.241 0.809
a. Dependent variable: Bias R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square F Sig.
0.212 0.045 0.041 11.746 0.000
Standard 
Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
(Constante) .302 .171 1.764 .078
Years*IFRS .016 .011 .046 1.417 .157
Dummy-Loss .150 .047 .101 3.198 .001
Num-Anal -.031 .012 -.095 -2.597 .010
Log_Assets .032 .012 .094 2.663 .008
a. Dependent variable : Accuracy R R Square
Adjusted R 
Square F Sig.
0.145 0.021 0.07 5.328 .000
1
Panel B: Dependent Variable : Accuracy 
Bias =  α0 + α1 Years*IFRS +  α2  Dummy-Loss  + α3 Num_Anal + α4 Log_Assets + ε0
Model
Coefficients
t Sig.
2
Statistics
Statistics
Accur =  α0 + α1 Years*IFRS +  α2  Dummy-Loss  + α3 Num_Anal + α4 Log_Assets + ε0
Model
Coefficients
t Sig.
that in average terms the measures did not 
significantly change during the years studied, 
either before or after IFRS adoption.
To strengthen the evidence, we 
computed the difference of the means between 
2007 (the year before IFRS adoption) and 
2011 (the most recent post-adoption year). 
We found no significant differences between 
these years. We should note that although not 
documented in tables, the average differences 
of the means between 2009 and all the other 
years studied were significant. In this case, 
the accuracy in that year was lower than in the 
other years, perhaps explained by the process 
of adapting the international standards.
Additionally, we applied the Kruskal-
Wallis test to check whether the years 
present the same dispersion of results. The 
null hypothesis was rejected, indicating 
differentiated behavior in terms of variance 
for the years studied.
5.3.2 Regression models
Table 4 depicts the regression models 
estimated and their significant statistics. With 
respect to bias (Panel A), the dummy variable 
for money-losing firms and the variable for 
number of analysts were significant, providing 
further support that analysts tend to be biased 
toward optimism regarding firms that wind in 
the red and that the forecasts become more 
pessimistic with an increasing number of 
analysts.
For accuracy (Panel B), it tended 
to be lower for loss-making firms and for 
larger firms, while it became greater with an 
increasing number of analysts following the 
firm.
The Years*IFRS variable was not 
significant regarding bias or accuracy, 
making it impossible to state with reasonable 
confidence that IFRS adoption in Brazil had 
an effect on these properties of analysts’ 
estimates.
Although not documented in the tables, 
to assure the robustness of the statistics we 
performed additional tests, among them: 
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(i) Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test, which 
indicated the residuals had normal distribution; 
(ii) variance inflation factor (VIF) test, which 
presented high values, but lower than the limits 
that would have indicated a serious problem of 
multicollinearity; and (iii) Breusch-Godfrey 
(BG) test, which indicated no autocorrelation 
of the residuals.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL 
CONSIDERATIONS
The analyses reported in this article 
regarding the characteristics of the earnings 
projection errors of analysts in the Brazilian 
capital market between 2007 and 2011, the 
years around the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards in Brazil, 
indicate:
A. The analysts were pessimistic 
in average terms. This was shown by a 
significantly positive mean projection 
error. Furthermore, the analysts on average 
performed weakly regarding accuracy and 
precision.
B. The analysts were particularly 
optimistic with respect to firms that wound 
up losing money in the periods covered by the 
forecasts. In this respect, analysts of Brazilian 
companies proportionally commit many 
more negative projection errors for losing 
companies than for profitable ones. 
C. As the number of analysts covering 
firms increased, the accuracy of their 
projections rose during the study period. On 
the other hand, with growing firm size there 
was a tendency for less accurate forecasts, 
probably because larger companies have more 
complex accounting practices.
D. For the years from 2007 to 2011 we 
did not find any significant differences in terms 
of accuracy and bias, except for 2009, in which 
there was great dispersion in these metrics. A 
possible explanation is the difficulties faced 
in the process of conversion to international 
accounting standards that year.
E. For the companies analyzed, the 
adoption of IFRS during the study period 
did not yet cause significant changes in the 
statistical properties of the analysts’ forecasts. 
The adoption of IFRS maintained a positive 
correlation with the increase in the coverages 
of analysts, indicating these standards created 
a more favorable environment to these 
information intermediaries. 
IFRS adoption cannot be viewed as 
a panacea for the problems of accountancy 
and inefficiencies of the capital market. The 
complexities of the adjustments to the new 
accounting rules and the slow process of 
consolidating the conversion of financial 
statements can partially explain the results 
found here.
The projections of analysts regarding 
Brazilian companies have substantial value 
and notwithstanding the insignificance of the 
shift to IFRS documented in the study period, 
the forecasts need to be placed in context and 
examined to find those that have conditions to 
be more effective. Understanding how these 
professionals operate in average terms is 
relevant from both an academic and practical 
standpoint. 
The observations made here can open 
the way to future research to help academics 
understand the expectations of the market and 
therefore to improve valuation models and 
optimize the calculation of variables, such as 
the cost of capital. 
Among the limitations of this study, 
the main one is the relatively small sample 
size. Nevertheless, the sample significantly 
reflected the composition of the firms listed 
on the BM&FBovespa and we included all 
those for which it was possible to obtain data 
from Thomson Reuter I/B/E/S. We should 
add that the study period covered years of 
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both strong and weak overall economic 
performance. Additionally, we gathered 
data from the financial statements in the 
Economática database to cross-reference 
them with the figures from Thomson Reuters 
I/B/E/S. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the 
possible existence of measurement errors due 
to the classification criteria used by these two 
sources of information.
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